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In Theory
Reframing Sacred Values
Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod
Sacred values differ from material or instrumental values in that they
incorporate moral beliefs that drive action in ways dissociated from
prospects for success.Across the world, people believe that devotion to
essential or core values — such as the welfare of their family and
country, or their commitment to religion, honor, and justice — are, or
ought to be, absolute and inviolable.
Counterintuitively, understanding an opponent’s sacred values, we
believe, offers surprising opportunities for breakthroughs to peace.
Because of the emotional unwillingness of those in conﬂict situations
to negotiate sacred values, conventional wisdom suggests that nego-
tiators should either leave sacred values for last in political negotia-
tions or should try to bypass them with sufﬁcient material incentives.
Our empirical ﬁndings and historical analysis suggest that conven-
tional wisdom is wrong. In fact, offering to provide material beneﬁts in
exchange for giving up a sacred value actually makes settlement more
difﬁcult because people see the offering as an insult rather than a
compromise. But we also found that making symbolic concessions of
no apparent material beneﬁt might open the way to resolving seem-
ingly irresolvable conﬂicts.
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We offer suggestions for how negotiators can reframe their position
by demonstrating respect and/or by apologizing for what they sin-
cerely regret.We also offer suggestions for how to overcome barriers by
reﬁning sacred values to exclude outmoded claims, exploiting the
inevitable ambiguity of sacred values, shifting the context, provision-
ally prioritizing values, and reframing responsibility.
Key words: conﬂict resolution, sacred values, framing, negotia-
tion, Israel, Palestine.
Conﬂicts that Appear Intractable
Sacred values differ from material or instrumental values in that they
incorporate moral beliefs that drive action in ways that seem dissociated
from prospects for success. Across the world, people believe that devo-
tion to essential or core values — such as the welfare of their family
and country, or their commitment to religion, honor, and justice — are,
or ought to be, absolute and inviolable. Such deeper “cultural”
values that are bound up with people’s identities often trump trade-
offs with other values, particularly economic ones (Carmichael et al.
1994).
In this essay, we focus on questions related to the current Israeli–
Palestinian conﬂict but also employ a wide range of historical examples
from international politics. Our intended audience is those scholars and
practitioners who are interested in understanding and resolving conﬂicts
that involve, or seem to involve, inviolable values.We hope our ﬁndings will
be useful to negotiation practitioners of all kinds including mediators,
diplomats, third-party neutrals, as well as the leaders and the publics
directly involved. We also hope that researchers who seek a deeper under-
standing of the problems and possibilities for resolving seemingly intrac-
table conﬂicts will ﬁnd our research useful.
Our analysis begins with the interest-based approach pioneered by
Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981).1 While the importance of framing is
well recognized in the negotiation literature, surprisingly little has been
written on how the process actually works.2 With this essay,we seek to ﬁll
that gap by analyzing how one frame can displace another. While we
discuss a wide variety of historical cases, we also draw on experimental
evidence from random samples of three stakeholder publics deeply
engaged in the same conﬂict, namely, the contemporary conﬂict between
Israel and Palestine. The process of randomly surveying these three publics
contrasts with the more common practice of relying on self-recruited
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American college students (e.g., Baron and Spranca 1997; Tetlock, Kristel,
and Elson 2000). In addition, we interviewed leaders involved in this con-
ﬂict to see how their responses compared to the responses of their con-
stituencies. Most important, our study of framing and reframing suggests a
number of ways to overcome barriers to conﬂict resolution when sacred
values are engaged.
Differences in sacred values are an important part of many funda-
mental political disputes and tend to make disputes much harder to
resolve (Susskind et al. 2005; Bazerman, Tebrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni
2008). Counterintuitively, understanding an opponent’s sacred values, we
believe, offers surprising opportunities for breakthroughs to peace.
Because of people’s emotional unwillingness to negotiate sacred values,
conventional wisdom suggests that negotiators should either leave sacred
values for last in political negotiations or should try to bypass them with
sufﬁcient material incentives. Our empirical ﬁndings and historical analy-
sis suggest that conventional wisdom is wrong. In fact, offering to provide
material beneﬁts in exchange for giving up a sacred value actually makes
settlement more difﬁcult because people see the offering as an insult
rather than a compromise. And leaving issues related to sacred values
for last only blocks compromise on otherwise mundane and material
matters.
Seemingly intractable political conﬂicts — in the Middle East, the
Balkans,Kashmir, Sri Lanka, and beyond — and the extreme behaviors often
associated with these conﬂicts, such as suicide bombings, are often moti-
vated by sacred values. Consider, for example, the view of martyrdom as a
sacred duty expressed to us by Sheikh Hamed Al Betawi, a judge of the
Shari’a Court of Palestine and a former preacher at Al Aqsa’ Mosque (the
Jerusalem mosque that represents the third-holiest site in Islam):“A martyr
ﬁghts and dies for dignity, nation, religion, and Al ‘Aqsa.’ In the Koran, the
book of Al-Tauba, verse 111, tells us that Allah brings souls to Paradise
killing the enemy and getting killed — that is the sacred principle of jihad”
(Al Betawi 2004).
Nevertheless, there have also been signiﬁcant historical instances in
which sacred values have motivated peacemaking, which Egypt’s Anwar
Sadat expressed in his autobiography, In Search of Identity (1977). He
recounts that the October 1973 War allowed Egypt to recover “pride and
self-conﬁdence,”which freed him to think about the“psychological barrier”
that was a “huge wall of suspicion, fear, hate and misunderstanding that has
for so long existed between Israel and the Arabs.” Based on his own
experience in jail, he felt that “change should take place ﬁrst at the deeper
and perhaps more subtle level than the conscious level. . . . We had been
accustomed . . . to regard Israel as ‘taboo,’ an entity whose emotional asso-
ciations simply prevented anyone from approaching it.” He ultimately
decided on a personal visit to the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and to the
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Israeli Knesset “in fulﬁllment of my claim that I would be willing to go
anywhere in search of peace. . . . I regarded my mission in Israel as truly
sacred” (Sadat 1977: 304).
Appeals to sacred values, then, can motivate both war and peace. The
issue for conﬂict resolvers is to determine how sacred values appeal to war
and how they can be reframed to appeal to peace.
In this time of great uncertainty in the Middle East,we went to the area
to conduct a scientiﬁc study on the values underpinning political conﬂict.
We based our questioning of senior Israeli and Palestinian leaders on a
recent series of surveys with hundreds of Palestinians and Israelis that dealt
with some hypothetical trade-offs for peace that have been discussed or
proposed in negotiations. Our research ﬁndings and discussions with
leaders indicate that violent opposition to compromise over issues that
people consider sacred actually increases when material incentives to
compromise are offered. Support for violence decreases, however,when an
adversary makes symbolic gestures that show recognition of the other’s
core values (Atran, Axelrod, and Davis 2007a; Ginges et al. 2007). Symbolic
gestures may then allow and facilitate political negotiations that also involve
material trade-offs.
Here we take a deeper look at the issues at stake, informed by analysis
of the recent history of political conﬂicts both in the Middle East and in
other areas of the world. The role of sacred values in political conﬂict is
often seriously misunderstood. Sacred values are certainly critical to the
maintenance of seemingly intractable rivalries. Our approach suggests that
a creative reframing of these values may often allow symbolic concessions
that can help resolve long-standing disputes, be they religious, ethnic, or
cultural.
Rational versus Devoted Actors
Ever since the end of the Second World War,“rational actor” models have
dominated strategic thinking at all levels of government policy (Gaddis
1995) and military planning (Allison 1971). Rational actor models have
always had serious deﬁciencies as general models of human reasoning and
decision making because human behavior can never be reduced purely to
rational calculation. But in a confrontation between states, and especially
during the Cold War, these models were arguably useful in anticipating a
wide array of challenges and formulating policies to prevent nuclear war.
Now, however, we are witnessing the rise of “devoted actors,” such as
suicide terrorists (Atran 2003), who are willing to make extreme sacriﬁces
that are independent of, or seem all out of proportion to, likely prospects of
success.3 This is most evident for the most tenacious conﬂicts that are
grounded in cultural and religious opposition rather than those based
primarily on political competition for resources.Nowhere is this issue more
pressing than in the Israeli–Palestinian dispute, which people across the
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world consistently view as one of the greatest dangers to world peace (Pew
Research Center 2006).
Efforts to resolve political conﬂicts or counter political violence are
still often based on the assumption that adversaries make rational choices.
Such assumptions are prevalent in risk assessment and modeling by foreign
aid and international development projects, and by American diplomatic,
military, and intelligence services. For example, the membership and per-
formance of the principal forum for U.S. foreign policy, the National Secu-
rity Council (NSC), which includes close policy coordination with the
National Economic Council, demonstrates that policy decisions should
result from instrumental choices by goal-oriented political and economic
actors. The U.S.National Security Strategy statement (U.S.NSC 2006) explic-
itly states a commitment to “results-oriented planning” that focuses on
“actions and results rather than legislation or rule-making.” It embodies a
clear focus on practical consequences rather than on moral principles
whose consequences may be indeterminate.
“Look at the NSC’s composition, which determines the direction of
U.S. foreign policy,”says Richard Davis (2007), a former director of terrorism
prevention at the White House Homeland Security Council. “It is institu-
tionally structured within a narrow intellectual frame weighted to consid-
eration of practical costs and beneﬁts in terms of our national economy,
intelligence, military, and law enforcement. There is limited provision for
missions of health, education, or human services that represent our values.”
An apparent exception to lack of concern with matters related directly to
human welfare is NSC monitoring of the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID). But even here, the NSC is most concerned
with USAID programs that have strict budgetary cycles and are often
considered as tactical means for advancing strategic interests.
“We can’t afford to wait for tsunamis to demonstrate that the U.S. does
not always act in its own self interest,”Davis noted. Indeed,unscheduled U.S
aid to Indonesian tsunami victims in early 2005 may represent the only
event since the invasion of Iraq that dramatically increased favorable
opinion of the U.S. in a major Muslim country, as well as the perception that
combating terrorism was not a uniquely U.S. problem. The implications of
the Pew survey, as suggested in the summary report by Pew, was that
through tsunami relief in Indonesia’s Aceh province, the United States
demonstrated to the Indonesian public that America could act in ways that
were not exclusively in its own self-interest. Indonesians became more
willing to see U.S. actions against terrorism in the region as not necessarily
only a matter of promoting U.S. interests. People began to dissociate U.S.
interests from terrorism and to consider terrorism a problem in its own
right (Pew Research Center 2005).
Here, one might be tempted to argue that U.S. policy is not sufﬁciently
rational, that the provision of health, education, and human services foreign
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aid has nothing to do with promoting values as such but is simply another
way to “buy” peace. Nevertheless, the more that one side perceives anoth-
er’s initiatives to be strongly motivated by self-interest, the less likely it is
that those initiatives will succeed in gaining trust in highly charged cultural
conﬂicts. For example, following the massive earthquake in Azad Kashmir
on October 5, 2005, the United States began providing humanitarian aid to
victims. When we interviewed villagers about this aid in May 2006,
however, many pointed to Apache helicopters that parachuted in supplies
and ubiquitous USAID signs as evidence that the United States was trying to
buy their support without engaging them personally. In contrast, Kashmiris
praised the many hundreds of Cuban doctors who tended patients in
remote villages for their“selﬂess”devotion to others,noting that the Cubans
came and left with no self-promoting speeches or signs (Kashmir 2006).
Many conﬂicts cannot be treated exclusively in terms of realpolitik or
the marketplace. To most of us, the thought of selling or endangering one’s
children or betraying one’s country for money (or for almost anything else
we can imagine) is morally abhorrent, and most of us would be outraged
and disgusted by someone willing to offer such a trade-off for our children,
our country, or anything else we may value as “sacred.” As we have seen,
when people are asked to trade sacred values for material rewards they
tend to react with outrage and anger (Baron and Spranca 1997; Tetlock
2003). Nevertheless they are sometimes able to accept privileging one
sacred value for another, such as devotion to religion versus devotion to
family.
Sacred Values
Sacred values are moral imperatives that seem to drive behavior indepen-
dently of any concrete material goal. They often have their basis in religion,
but such transcendent core secular values as a belief in the importance of
individual morality, fairness, reciprocity, and collective identity (i.e.,“justice
for my people”) can also be sacred values. These values will often trump
economic thinking or considerations of realpolitik.
For example, the U.S. Senate recently raised the bounty offered for
information leading to the capture of Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden to
ﬁfty million dollars (Anonymous 2007). It is doubtful, however, that this
new increase will have greater sway than previous increases among the
people living along the Afghan–Pakistan frontier who may know his where-
abouts. Even the poorest Pashtun tribesman in the area will defend to the
death an ancient code of honor known as pashtunwali. Its third tenet,
melmastiya, refers to hospitality as a sacred duty and requires protecting
valued guests at the risk of one’s own life. Violating this code means
repudiating tribal identity for one’s self and one’s family.
Devotion to some core values may represent universal responses to
long-term evolutionary strategies that go beyond short-term individual
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calculations of self-interest but that advance individual interests in the
aggregate and long run (Lim and Baron 1997). This may include devotion to
children (Hamilton 1964), to community (Durkheim 1912/1995), or even
to a sense of fairness (Hauser 2006). Other such values are clearly speciﬁc
to particular societies and historical contingencies, such as the sacred status
of cows in Hindu culture or the sacred status of Jerusalem in Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam.4 Sometimes, as with sacred cows (Harris 1966) or
sacred forests (Atran, Medin, and Ross 2005), what is seen as inherently
sacred in the present may have a more materialistic origin, representing the
accumulated material wisdom of generations who resisted individual urges
to gain an immediate advantage of meat or ﬁrewood for the long-term
beneﬁts of renewable sources of energy and sustenance.
Political leaders often appeal to sacred values as a way of mobilizing
their constituents to action (Varshney 2003) and as a least-cost method of
enforcing policy goals (Goodin 1980). Political leaders also invoke sacred
values as a least-cost method of discrediting adversaries, for example,when
U.S. politicians accuse one another of disregard for “the sanctity of mar-
riage”or of usurping“God’s gift of life.”What works as sacred in one society
is often entirely ineffective and mundane in another. When Iranian Presi-
dent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicly embraced and kissed on the hand an
elderly woman who used to be his schoolteacher, Iran’s ultraconservative
Hezbollah newspaper intoned: “This type of indecency progressively has
grave consequences, like violating religious and sacred values” (ABC Online
2007). Contrast the Iranian example with the kissing expected of American
candidates on campaign tours. A rallying cry to protect sacred values in one
culture can be utterly innocuous in another.
Many policy makers, however, argue that all so-called sacred values are
only “pseudo-sacred”because in a world of scarce resources there is always
room for trade-offs (Hoffman et al. 1999): people cannot really devote all of
their time,energy,and life to upholding any one such value.Even apparently
“irrational”behaviors arguably reﬂect“rational”calculations of the holdout’s
long-term interests, however incomprehensible those interests appear to
others. Consider the angry resistance of the impoverished Lakota Sioux to
offers of hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation for the Black Hills
that the U.S. government has claimed ownership of since 1877 (Lazarus
1999). The Sioux say that claims on their land are claims to their identity as
a people. Another example is Adolph Hitler’s “principled” refusal to maxi-
mize material beneﬁts for war. To uphold the scientiﬁcally baseless but
sacred value of “racial purity,” Hitler vehemently refused the equivalent of
hundreds of millions dollars in payoffs to racially reclassify a relatively few
Austrian Jews (Eidinow and Edmonds 2001).
In these and other examples, the actors may be described as “holding
out”for greater beneﬁts, such as eternal glory over worldly greed,where, for
them,glory is a more rewarding and hence more rational outcome.But such
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interpretations only obscure the issue by giving post hoc interpretations of
any seemingly irrational behavior (in the sense of immunity to material
trade-offs) so as to ﬁt a rational actor model. No explanatory or predictive
power is thereby gained.
Given these interpretations of apparently irrational behavior, one
might be tempted to think of protected values, including sacred values, as
self-serving “posturing” or part of some strategy for longer-term economic
or psychological beneﬁts (Baron and Spranca 1997). It is true that sacred
values are sometimes exploited by politicians for their own material inter-
ests or some greater future gain, such as enhanced personal reputation,
prestige, and votes.Nevertheless, the seeming intractability of certain politi-
cal conﬂicts and the reality of violence associated with these conﬂicts, such
as suicide bombings, compels negotiation scholars and researchers to pay
greater attention to the nature and depth of people’s commitment to sacred
values.5
Apparently Irrational Conﬂict
One reason resource-deﬁcient revolutionary movements can compete with
much larger armies and police forces is the willingness of members of these
movements to delay gratiﬁcation and sacriﬁce themselves for a greater
cause. Consider the founding of the United States: without calculating the
probability of success, a few poorly equipped rebels knowingly took on the
mightiest empire in the world (Dickinson 1768).6 The Declaration of Inde-
pendence concluded with the words:“And for the support of this Declara-
tion, with a ﬁrm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we
mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred
Honor.”
Matters of principle, or “sacred honor,” are enforced to a degree far out
of proportion to any individual or immediate material payoff when they are
seen as deﬁning “who we are.”Revenge,“even if it kills me,”between whole
communities that mobilize to redress insult or shame to a single member go
far beyond individual “tit-for-tat” (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) and may
become the most important duties in life. This is because such behavior
deﬁnes and defends what it means to be, say, a Southern gentleman (Nisbett
and Cohen 1996), a Solomon Islander (Havemeyer 1929), or an Arab tribes-
man (Peters 1967). The Israeli army has risked the lives of many soldiers to
save one or a few as a matter of “sacred duty,” as have certain elite U.S.
military units (Bowden 2000).
Of course, sincere displays of willingness to avenge at all costs can
have the long-term payoff of thwarting aggressive actions by stronger but
less committed foes. Likewise, a willingness to sacriﬁce for buddies can
help create greater esprit du corps that may lead to a more formidable
ﬁghting force. But these acts far exceed the effort required for any short-
term payoff and offer no immediate guarantee for long-term success.
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To study possible trade-offs between sacred values and material
rewards, in 2005 we talked with families and supporters of Palestinian
suicide bombers. We asked about the amount of compensation that their
society should give to the family of a suicide bomber. We found that
willingness to allow compensation decreased as the amount offered
increased: one hundred thousand dinars is signiﬁcantly less acceptable than
ten thousand dinars, and one million dinars is much less acceptable (Atran
2007a). Follow-up interviews clearly point to a willingness to accept
minimal compensation for loss of a family member (who may be a helper
or wage earner) and one’s home (Israeli retaliation often includes destruc-
tion of the bomber’s house).Nevertheless, Palestinians see more substantial
payments to families as unacceptable, even disgusting, because they would
create the impression that the martyr had acted as a materially calculating
actor rather than as a martyr devoted to a moral cause.
In conjunction with Israeli psychologist Jeremy Ginges and Palestinian
political scientist Khalil Shikaki, our team surveyed more than twelve
hundred Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and found differences
between those Palestinians who refuse political compromise because they
believe it violates sacred values versus those Palestinians who do not
(Ginges et al. 2007). Both groups overwhelmingly support suicide bomb-
ings that may include the killing of civilians. Each group was given a
hypothetical choice to delay a suicide bombing to save the lives of an entire
Palestinian family or to delay a suicide bombing to save only the sick father.7
Palestinians who do not consider political compromise to violate sacred
values expressed the rational preference of trading off an obligation for the
sake of the entire family rather than for the father alone. By contrast, the
sacred values group was more likely to express willingness to delay a
suicide bombing if only the sick father would beneﬁt rather than to save the
lives of an entire family, including the father (Atran 2007b).
These examples also highlight what we call moral framing. When
considering delaying a martyrdom mission in order to help a sick father, the
trade-off is allowed within an overarching moral frame of social duties and
(material) attempts to balance duties. But when considering delaying a
mission to save one’s own family from retaliation,only the bombing mission
itself falls within the moral frame of duty, and avoidance of retaliation is
considered a cowardly and immoral act. In this case, the higher the costs,
the less likely there is willingness to compromise in the performance
of duty.
Consider another example of insensitivity to quantity or material
balance. Recently, a group of Holocaust survivors traveled to Maidenak
Death Camp in Poland on what they considered a sacred mission to search
for mementos of those killed by the Nazis.“We’ve spent a million dollars so
far to ﬁnd rings worth maybe $100 retail,” said an organizer of the expedi-
tion.“But the objects tell a powerful story. There is no way that a modern
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person can understand the experience, but looking at an object. . . . Its
rescue gives us all an opportunity to connect with the people here and
their sacriﬁce” (Roberts 2005).8
It is the“who we are” identity aspect that is often so hard for members
of one culture to understand regarding another. Nevertheless, understand-
ing and acknowledging other peoples’ values may help to avoid or resolve
even long-standing and deep-seated conﬂicts. Consider, for example, the
paciﬁcation of postwar Japan. Many in the wartime U.S. administration and
military considered the Japanese Emperor a war criminal who should be
executed. But wartime advisors such as anthropologists Ruth Benedict and
Margaret Mead, as well as psychological-warfare specialists in General
Douglas MacArthur’s command (Dower 1999), argued that preserving, and
even signaling respect for, the Emperor might lessen the likelihood that the
Japanese,who regarded him with religious awe,would ﬁght to the death to
save him. Moreover, his symbolic weight could, and would, be used by the
occupation government to bolster moderate and pro-American factions in
postwar Japan.
Consider as well, in this regard, the case of “ping-pong” diplomacy
between the United States and China. As expected, the Chinese won match
after match against the visiting American table tennis team in 1971. In the
United States, ping-pong is considered a“basement sport” so there was little
at stake. In contrast, table tennis is a sport of national prestige to China
(Eckstein 1993). So, at little cost to itself, the United States was able to
provide something of great symbolic value for the other side. This exchange
contributed to a historic breakthrough in Sino-American relations during
the Cold War.9
Sometimes the symbolic value of a gesture that is weighty to the
parties directly involved may seem trivial to an outside party. If France
allowed Muslim students to wear headscarves in public schools, which is
now prohibited,beneﬁcial effects could reverberate throughout the Muslim
world. For most Americans and their political leaders, this would not be a
signiﬁcant concession — Muslim and Jewish headgear in public schools is
commonplace and uncontroversial in the United States. The problem,
however, is that in France, unlike in the United States, signs of physical and
religious distinction in school are considered to be an affront to the sym-
bolically deﬁning value of French political culture ever since the French
Revolution, namely, a universal and uniform sense of social equality
(however lacking in practice).“The only community is the nation,”declared
former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (Anonymous 2005) —
an uninterrupted national sentiment that dates to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
Social Contract (1762). Indeed, the American ideal of cultural diversity is
perceived by a broad political spectrum in France as an attempt to force an
alien notion of community and identity between the only two moral enti-
ties that are widely recognized in France: the individual and the state (Roy
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2004). This example shows that recognizing one another’s sacred values is
not a transparent process, even for allies and for members of societies that
seem similar in so many other ways. More importantly, it illustrates that
recognizing and showing respect for another’s core values is easy or even
possible only if doing so does not entail compromising one’s own core
values.
Symbolic Concessions
When we brief policy makers around the world on our research, they often
readily acknowledge their own values as sacred yet fail to appreciate
adequately the sacred values of others.We are often surprised to hear, after
the brieﬁng is ﬁnished, that “of course it’s all about [sacred] values.” And
despite the institutional preference for rational choice thinking, we ﬁnd
that ordinary people in surveys around the world also tell us that sacred
values are important to them.
To measure emotional outrage and propensity for violence, our
research team asked about various peace deals involving compromises over
issues integral to the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict. For this analysis we used
three samples from the West Bank and Gaza. The ﬁrst was a sample of 535
Palestinian refugees, the second was a sample of 719 Palestinian students,
and the third was a sample of 601 Jewish adult settlers residing in the West
Bank and Gaza (Ginges et al. 2007).10 The proposed compromises were
exchanging land for peace (asked of settlers), sovereignty over Jerusalem
(asked of students), the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their former
lands and homes inside Israel (asked of refugees), and recognition of the
validity of the adversary’s own sacred values (asked of all three groups).We
proposed material incentives, such as signiﬁcant payments to individual
families, credible offers to relocate or rebuild destroyed infrastructure, and
so forth. We found that such material offers to promote the peaceful
resolution of political and cultural conﬂicts backﬁre when adversaries con-
sider contested issues to reﬂect sacred values. Material offers to make
concessions that were seen as violations of sacred values were perceived as
insults.But we also found that symbolic concessions of no apparent material
beneﬁt might open the way to resolving seemingly irresolvable conﬂicts.
One senior member of the National Security Council responded
recently to our latest brieﬁng in this way:“This seems right. On the settlers
[who were to be removed from Gaza], [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon
realized too late that he shouldn’t have berated them about wasting Israel’s
money and endangering soldier’s lives. Sharon told me that he realized only
afterwards that he should have made a symbolic concession and called
them Zionist heroes making yet another sacriﬁce” (Atran, Axelrod, and
Davis 2007a).
A further illustration of how sacred values can lie at the heart of
deep-seated political disputes comes from Isaac Ben Israel, a former Air
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Force general and current Knesset member in Israel’s ruling coalition:
“Israel recognizes that the [Hamas-led] Palestinian government is still com-
pletely focused on what it considers to be its essential principles. . . . For
Hamas, a refusal to utter the simple words ‘We recognize Israel’s right to
exist’ is clearly an essential part of their core values. Why else would they
suffer the international boycott . . . and let their own government workers
go without pay, their people go hungry,and their leaders risk assassination?”
Hamas’s Ghazi Hamad, then spokesman for the Palestinian government, told
us:“In principle we have no problem with a Palestinian state encompassing
all of our lands within the 1967 borders. But let Israel apologize for our
tragedy in 1948, and then we can talk about negotiating over our right of
return to historic Palestine.” In rational-choice models of decision making,
that something as intangible as an apology should stand in the way of peace
does not readily compute.
A closer look at apologies in political conﬂicts indicates that such
concessions may not be so much deal makers in themselves, as means of
facilitating political compromise that may also involve signiﬁcant material
transactions.One telling example concerns the negotiations between Israel
and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1951, before Germany began
reparations payments and before diplomatic relations were established
between the two countries (Lustick 2006). In 1948, the newly established
State of Israel was in dire economic straits. But Israel and the World Jewish
Congress refused to demand direct compensation from Germany for the
property of murdered European Jews. Any ofﬁcial recognition or contact
with Germany was morally anathema, no matter how actively opposed
then-German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and others in his government
had been to the previous Nazi regime, and no matter how desperate the
need for the money to help consolidate the Jewish state.
With the West’s acceptance of the Federal Republic, Jewish insistence
on a world boycott of Germany seemed politically untenable. Despite
recognizing the political weakness of its international position, Israel
insisted that before any amount of money could be considered, Germany
must publicly declare contrition for the murder and suffering of Jews at
German hands. On September 27, 1951, Adenauer delivered a much antici-
pated speech at the Bundestag, the German national parliament, acknowl-
edging that “the Federal Republic and with it the great majority of the
German people are aware of the immeasurable suffering that was brought
upon the Jews of Germany and the occupied territories during the time of
National Socialism. The overwhelming majority of the German people
abominated the crimes committed against the Jews and did not participate
in them.”Although this symbolic concession to Jewish sensibilities was only
half-hearted — because, in fact, the majority of wartime Germans at least
acquiesced to Nazi actions — it was enough to start the reconciliation
process between Israel and Germany.
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Of course, recognition of sacred values will not lessen tensions if the
recognition is perceived as not merely half-hearted but actually insincere.
Take, for example, the U.S. administration’s apology for the abuse of detain-
ees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In May 2004, then-Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld offered “my deepest apology” to “those Iraqis who were
mistreated” (Garamone 2004). He then went on to claim that mistreatment
was not the fault of U.S. policy, purpose, or principle, but of a few wayward
soldiers whose behavior was “inconsistent with the values of our nation,
inconsistent with the teachings of the military, and it was fundamentally
un-American.” As historian Elazar Barkan notes, this hedging of regret at the
abuse of the prisoners with regret of Arab misunderstanding of American
culture “did not quell the critics.” The apology was angrily dismissed as
insincere by large segments of the Arab and Muslim world (Barkan 2006).
Mustafa Zahrani, an Iranian scholar and former top diplomat, told us
recently that “symbolic statements are important if sincere and without
reservation. It was important to us that the United States show consider-
ation and respect for our culture. But in 2000, I was with the mullahs in
Mecca when [then-Secretary of State Madeleine] Albright seemed to apolo-
gize to Iran for past offenses but then said [in a memorandum] ‘despite the
trend towards democracy, control over the military, judiciary, courts and
police remain in unelected hands.’ Our leadership interpreted this as a call
for a coup inside our country” (Atran, Axelrod, and Davis 2007a).11
Symbolic gestures do not always stand alone, unhinged from all mate-
rial considerations. Rather, they often help to recast a moral frame that
determines the scope and limits of possible material transactions and nego-
tiations. Consider, in this regard, attempts by Israeli and Palestinian negotia-
tors to reach agreement following the 2000 Camp David Summit. Then-
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had expressed readiness to state regret for
the suffering of Palestinian refugees who ﬂed or were expelled during what
Israel calls its “War of Independence” and what Palestinians call “the Catas-
trophe” (al-Nakba) and to perhaps accept shared responsibility, but not
primary responsibility (as Palestinian leaders insisted). U.S. President Bill
Clinton was further prepared to declare publicly the need to compensate
and resettle refugees, without requiring Israel to accept refugees into its
own territory or to acknowledge responsibility for their sorrow (Gresh
2001).
At Taba in January 2001, the Palestinian delegation formally continued
to insist on Israel recognizing “its moral and legal responsibility for the
forced displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian civilian popula-
tion during the 1948 war and for preventing the refugees from returning to
their homes.” Palestinian negotiators downplayed this insistence when
Israel acknowledged willingness to express some responsibility for Pales-
tinian suffering in the wake of Israel’s creation and to allow for a symbolic
return of a limited number of 1948 refugees into Israel itself (Lustick 2006).
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Unfortunately, the timing was wrong. Clinton was handing over power to
George W. Bush, and Ehud Barak was about to be replaced by Ariel Sharon.
The new leaders wanted to revise the decisions of their political rivals.12
With these historical considerations about failed negotiations and our
previous experimental ﬁndings about sacred barriers to conﬂict resolution
in mind, the members of our team went to the Middle East to compare the
responses of leaders to the responses of their publics. From February to
March 2007 we talked to leaders of Hamas in Damascus and Gaza, Fateh in
Ramallah, and Israel in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (Atran, Axelrod, and Davis
2007b). We probed directly issues of material trade-offs and symbolic con-
cessions. Leaders responded in the same way as their publics, except that
for leaders the symbolic concession was not enough in itself but only a
necessary condition to opening serious negotiations involving material
issues as well. For example, Musa Abu Marzouk, the former chairman and
current deputy chairman of Hamas, said “No” to a trade-off for peace
without granting a right of return, a more emphatic “No, we do not sell
ourselves for any amount” when offered a trade-off with a substantial
material incentive (credible offering of substantial U.S. aid for the rebuilding
of Palestinian infrastructure), but “Yes, an apology is important, but only as
a beginning. It’s not enough because our houses and land were taken away
from us and something has to be done about that” (Abu Marzouk 2007).
In a parallel line of questioning, we asked Binyamin Netanyahu, a
former Israeli Prime Minister and the current opposition leader in parlia-
ment,“Would you seriously consider accepting a two-state solution follow-
ing the 1967 borders if all major Palestinian factions, including Hamas,were
to recognize the right of the Jewish people to an independent state in the
region?” Referring to symbolic concessions as well as security beneﬁts, he
answered,“OK, but the Palestinians would have to show that they sincerely
mean it, change their textbooks and anti-Semitic characterizations, and then
allow some border adjustments so that Ben Gurion [Airport] would be out
of range of shoulder-ﬁred missiles” (Netanyahu 2007).
As Ariel Merari, Israel’s former chief hostage negotiator, told us:“Trust-
ing the adversary’s intentions is critical to negotiations, which have no
chance unless both sides believe the other’s willingness to recognize its
existential concerns” (2007). Indeed, recognition of some “existential
values” may change other existential values into material concerns, “since
the PLO’s recognition of Israel, most Israelis no longer see rule over the
West Bank as existential.”
Overcoming Sacred Barriers
Sacred values provide the moral frame that delimits which agreements are
possible. For the most part, members of a moral community — be it a
family, ethnic group, religious congregation, or nation — implicitly share
their community’s sacred values. Thus, there is usually no need to refer to
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these values or even to be conscious of them when pursuing trade-offs or
negotiations within a community. Sacred values usually become highly
relevant and salient only when challenged, much as food takes on over-
whelming value in people’s lives only when it is denied. Direct threats to a
community’s sacred values are most apparent when different moral com-
munities come into conﬂict.
Conﬂict becomes so intense as to appear irresolvable when different
communities frame values in ways that make them seem incompatible with
each other. But what often makes values incompatible is the way they are
applied to the here and now. While values can be held ﬁrmly, their appli-
cation depends a good deal on how they are understood, and what they are
taken to imply, and these interpretations and applications of sacred values
are not always ﬁxed and inﬂexible. Indeed, sacred values that seem incom-
patible within certain frames may actually become compatible when
reframed.
In what follows, we offer some advice for reframing sacred values in
order to overcome barriers to conﬂict resolution. We base this advice on
our empirical ﬁndings and historical analyses.
Reﬁne Sacred Values to Exclude Outmoded Claims
Article 32 of the Hamas Covenant (1988) highlights “Zionist scheming
. . . laid out in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.” The Protocols is a
notorious anti-Semitic tract forged by Russian Czarist police. In private,
Hamas leaders grant that The Protocols may not be a statement of fact. By
explicitly renouncing its endorsement of The Protocols, Hamas could dem-
onstrate that it no longer wants others to see it as anti-Semitic. Likewise,
Israel could distance itself from the old Zionist slogan that Palestine was,“A
Land without People for a People without Land.”13
Our talks with leaders on both sides indicate awareness that their
current positions involve outmoded and historically inaccurate claims.They
also acknowledge that were the other side to renounce such blatant false-
hoods, this could lead to a psychological breakthrough. Overcoming his-
torical precedents and emotional barriers to renouncing even patently false
claims, however, may require neutral mediation by those who understand
both sides. Even then, it takes time. According to Lord John Alderdice, a
principal mediator in the Northern Ireland conﬂict, it took nine years of
back-and-forth for this to happen in Northern Ireland (Alderdice 2007a and
2007b).14
Exploit the Inevitable Ambiguity of Sacred Values
Reframing values may require creative ambiguity and involve asymmetry in
the way each side perceives the reframing. For example, during World
War II the U.S.government promised the American people and its allies that
it would accept nothing less than “unconditional surrender.” But the
government and people of Japan were adamant that the Emperor must
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be preserved. Realizing this, the United States reframed the meaning of
“unconditional surrender” by making clear that it would graciously
allow the Emperor of Japan to retain his title and liberty.
People often apply the “same” sacred values in different ways, which
facilitates creative use of ambiguity. Many Americans consider “equality” to
be a core value, a gift from God, and a self-evident truth as stated in the
Declaration of Independence and codiﬁed under the law in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Historically, though, popular and legal
notions of equality have varied considerably and continue to do so: from
voting privileges only for property-holding white males to “universal suf-
frage,” and from “separate but equal” education for whites and blacks to
“equal opportunity” for all men and women.
Religious values are particularly open-textured in this way (Atran
2002), however much people believe their interpretation to be the only
literal or right one. In Judaism, the religious commandment to “Keep the
Sabbath Holy,” whose violation in biblical times was punishable by death,
continues to undergo radical reinterpretation: in today’s Jerusalem, a chief
dispute between Orthodox versus Reform Jews is whether God allows
driving on Saturdays. Or, take the biblical commandment “Thou Shalt Not
Kill” — many U.S. conservatives believe it warrants both an antiabortion
agenda and capital punishment, whereas many U.S. liberals consider this
commandment to warrant abolition of capital punishment and a pro-
abortion rights agenda. American political leaders who seek election or
to govern from the center must learn to ﬁnesse seemingly contrary inter-
pretations of sacred values in creative ways.
For both Israelis and Palestinians,“The Land” is sacred, with Jerusalem
at its center. Israelis simply refer to their country as “The Land” (Ha-Aretz),
whereas for Palestinians “Land and Honor” (Ard wal ‘Ard) are one. Israeli
political leaders creatively reinterpreted the historical scope of “The Land,”
ﬁrst to justify claims on Gaza and then to justify leaving it. If Palestinians,
who simply refer to Jerusalem as “The Holy” (Al Quds), can reframe their
idea of the city to include only its Arab suburbs and part of the Temple
Mount (Haram Al-Sharif ), then Israel might be willing to accept the
Palestinian capital there. Constructively reframing the issue of Jerusalem in
this way need not call into question “the strength of attachment” to the
sacred value of Jerusalem.
For Muslims, the meaning of jihad, or “Holy War,” can be interpreted in
radically different ways, whether as an inner mental struggle for the pres-
ervation of faith or as physical combat against external enemies who
threaten Islam. For supporters of militant Islamist groups whom we have
surveyed, including members of Hamas and Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah,
jihad is the “Sixth Pillar” of Islam, which trumps four of the ﬁve traditional
pillars (almsgiving, pilgrimage, fasting, and prayer); only the pillar express-
ing faith in God stands up to jihad. For many other Muslims, there is no
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such “Sixth Pillar,” and professed belief in it may be heretical and blasphe-
mous. Given the popular and political division of Palestinian society today,
Palestinian leaders must carefully navigate meanings of jihad without
alienating major segments of Palestinian society or the outside world.
This issue of reframing jihad is currently an important consideration in
Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism efforts. As one senior Saudi ofﬁcial (2008)
recently told us:
During the Afghanistan war [with the Soviets] we praised the
mujahedin and Bin Laden in our newspapers everyday. He was
the leader of the Arab heroes.Mujahedin entered our vocabulary
in a positive frame. Then we said he was bad. The people were
confused. Before a hero and overnight a bad man. We had to
reframe jihad to distinguish “moral jihad” from the Takﬁri ideol-
ogy [a “rejectionist” view of Islam, including rejection of Wahabi
and Salaﬁ ideology which prohibits sowing discord, or ﬁtna,
among Muslims; takﬁr means “excommunication” and preaches
that those who do no follow jihad are kuffar, or “inﬁdels,” includ-
ing Muslims who are excommunicated and so can be killed]. The
mujahedin had been heroes for us, and for you [America] in
Afghanistan and now they were terrorists . . . and we had to have
a way of reframing jihad in order to show that the Takﬁri way of
jihad was different, their training, ideology, tactics.
Shift the Context
One way leaders can navigate through the muddle of meanings that attend
sacred values is to shift the context so that one sacred value becomes more
relevant than others in a speciﬁc context. At West Point for example, cadets
acculturate to two competing “honor codes.” There is a formal one, which
requires telling the truth and obeying the orders of hierarchical superiors,
and an informal one, which entails loyalty to peers. Army leaders under-
stand that at times they must carefully balance vertical loyalty to command-
ers against horizontal loyalties to comrades, for example, by not punishing
cadets who refuse to snitch on their buddies.
We spoke with Sheikh Hassan Yousef, a West Bank Hamas leader
currently detained in Israel’s Ketziot prison, about suicide bombers. “Suf-
fering and humiliation make it understandable, even animals defend them-
selves to the death,” he told us.“But God created people to live, not to die.
We have to ﬁnd an exit. We need a dialogue of civilizations, not a clash of
civilizations. No mother wants her child to die” (Atran 2004). Then-
Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniya expressed a similar sentiment to us
(Atran 2006). These Hamas leaders clearly mean here to appeal to our
common understanding of humanity as being equal to, or greater than,
Islamist calls for martyrdom. Of course, on other occasions and in other
circumstances these same leaders may reverse priorities, for example,when
they feel possible windows of opportunity for a breakthrough to the
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outside, such as international recognition or aid, are closed to them. Such
changing appeals do not necessarily represent either “ﬂip ﬂops” in thinking
or hypocrisy but a ﬂuid and changing appreciation of values according to
how circumstances can be framed in terms of them. That is part of the
paradoxical nature of sacred values, “eternal” and morally absolute, yet
widely open to interpretation.
One way to shift context is to change a value’s scope from the here
and now to an indeﬁnite time in the future. In the 1920s, for example, the
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin moved the goal of a world victory for commu-
nism to an indeﬁnite future when he declared communism in one country
to have priority, contradicting Lenin’s views that the imperial powers were
about to destroy themselves in historical time.
Ami Ayalon, former head of Shin Beit, Israel’s counter-terrorism and
internal security agency, expressed to us his view that Hamas’s proposals
for a hudna, or provisional armistice, could be moving in this direction (see
Atran, Axelrod, and Davis 2007c). Consider that the ﬁrst hudna was the
eighth-century Treaty of Hudaibiyyah, a nonaggression pact between
Mohammed and the Quraish tribe. The founder of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed
Yasin,originally offered a ten-year hudna in return for complete withdrawal
from all territories captured in the Six Day War and the establishment of a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. At various times, Yasin stated
that a hudna was renewable for thirty, forty, or one hundred years, although
it would never signal recognition of Israel. Ahmed Yousef, political adviser
to then-Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, told us that there is no
limit in principle to how many times a hudna might be renewed. He
compared Hamas’s practical willingness to live alongside Israel to the Irish
Republican Army’s (IRA) willingness to accept a permanent armistice with
Great Britain while still refusing to recognize British sovereignty over
Northern Ireland. Of course, the IRA never refused to recognize Britain’s
existence, and many Israelis believe that Hamas’s refusal of recognition and
permanent peace indicate that any hudna will just be a smoke screen to
allow military preparation for an eventual attack on Israel. For Ahmed
Yousef, an indeﬁnite hudna in no way contradicts Hamas’s refusal to
recognize Israel. But for Ami Ayalon (who recently lost the vote for leader-
ship of Israel’s Labor Party to Ehud Barak), a hudna that disallows military
preparation for an attack on Israel and does not explicitly rule out some
future form of recognition can allow dialogue.
Provisionally Prioritize Values
Fulﬁlling one sacred value may require delay in achieving others. To save
the American Union, President Abraham Lincoln was willing to postpone
emancipation. Similarly, Israeli leader David Ben Gurion was willing to
accept a partition of Palestine that left Israel without control over historical
Judea or Jerusalem in order to attain statehood. Lincoln and Ben Gurion
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both wanted the delay to be only provisional. Nevertheless, in later life Ben
Gurion argued against settlement in the West Bank and Gaza. This example
suggests that prioritization of current values may allow for a change in the
scope of values over time.
Yasser Arafat,who headed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
steered that organization to ofﬁcially recognize Israel. But Fateh, the PLO’s
largest contingent, also headed by Arafat, has never renounced its guiding
principles and goals. These include, in Article 12 of Fateh’s constitution, the
“complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic,
political, military, and cultural existence” (Fateh 1964). In a related vein,
Hamas’s Ghazi Hamad noted that although Hamas may continue to call for
an end to Israel, a Hamas-led government could ofﬁcially acknowledge
Israel if a majority of Palestinians expressed this desire through a popular
referendum.“There is a difference between a political party’s principles and
obligations of a government,” he told us. “After all, not everything in the
Republican Party platform is United States government policy.”
Previous Israeli governments were never entirely convinced that
Arafat’s commitment to the PLO position on recognition of Israel trumped
the Fateh Constitution’s prohibition of recognition. The current Israeli
government rejected the idea that the Hamas-led government would pos-
sibly“allow”recognition of Israel as a Hamas ploy to mask its real intentions
to destroy Israel. But several senior members of the present Israeli govern-
ment and opposition to whom we spoke consider Palestinian president and
current Fateh leader Mahmoud Abbas to be sincere in recognizing Israel’s
right to exist and in wanting peace, despite the persistence of nonrecog-
nition clauses in Fateh’s constitution. This suggests, again, that pragmatic
prioritization of one value over another, however provisional to begin with,
may facilitate a more permanent realignment of values.
Demonstrate Respect Where Possible
One way to demonstrate respect for the other side’s sacred values is to avoid
insulting the other side with offers to buy off their core values with money.
As we have seen,offering material trade-offs for core values can backﬁre and
actually increase moral outrage, disgust, and propensity for violence.
Another relatively low-cost way to show respect for other’s values is to
ﬁnd things that mean much to the other side but little to one’s own side.
In the case of “ping-pong diplomacy” that we discussed earlier, the United
States demonstrated respect for Chinese sensitivity about receiving equal
treatment on the world stage by demonstrating that America does not
always have to better China in matters that the Chinese care for.
As an example of a relatively small symbolic step that may have big
implications, consider the recent approval by the Israeli education ministry
of a textbook for Arab third graders in Israel that for the ﬁrst time describes
Israel’s 1948 War of Independence as a “catastrophe” for many Palestinians
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and their society. In a recent op-ed in the International Herald Tribune,
Rami Khouri, director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American Univer-
sity of Beirut and editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, echoed a
growing sentiment that
this may be the ﬁrst tangible sign that the Zionist Israeli estab-
lishment is prepared to move in the direction of acknowledging
what happened to Palestinians in 1948,which is a vital Palestinian
demand for any serious peace-making effort to succeed. Israelis in
turn would expect a reciprocal Palestinian acknowledgement of
Israel’s core narrative (Khouri 2007).
It is noteworthy that the revised textbooks are only for Arab children,
not Jewish children, which is why, above, we characterized this symbolic
step as “relatively small.” If Jewish children also learned this revised history
it would better signal a sincere concession. But such a concession, though
still relatively easy to implement, carries increased risk for undermining
part of Zionism’s moral narrative among the next generation. Undertaking
the added risk may require an offsetting symbolic gesture from the other
side. As Binyamin Netanyahu intimated, a change in Palestinian textbooks
that omitted reference to Jewish perﬁdy since the time of Mohammed
could reciprocally signal a sincere change of heart.
Still another way to demonstrate respect for the“who we are”aspect of
a sacred value is to use the other side’s preferred name: for example, the
People’s Republic of China rather than “red China,” Israel rather than “the
Jewish entity,” or the Palestinian people rather than “Palestinian Arabs.”
Apologize for What You Sincerely Regret
An apology should be consistent with one’s own core values while simul-
taneously demonstrating sensitivity to the values of others. Unfortunately,
an apology that is viewed as insincere can make matters worse. A good
example is Japan’s repeated apologies for atrocities committed in World
War Two. China dismissed Japan’s apologies and practically froze relations
between the two countries when Japanese Prime Minister Junishiro
Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine, a shrine that honors Japan’s
2.5 million war dead but also includes fourteen convicted Class-A war
criminals (People’s Daily Online 2006; Onishi 2007).15
Likewise, a qualiﬁed apology can be seen as worse than none at all.We
have seen this in the case of the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib.When the
United States apologized only for the acts of a fewwayward soldiers,the result
was angry dismissal by many in the Arab and Muslim world (Barkan 2006).
Without the acceptance of responsibility, apologies may not work. For
Palestinians, Israel’s continued settlement activity has been inconsistent
with steps made toward recognition of Palestinian rights, including
acknowledgment of some responsibility for the 1948 “catastrophe” and
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recognition of the plight of Palestinian refugees. For Israelis, in turn, the
Palestinian Authority’s failure to prevent armed attacks on Israeli civilians
has been inconsistent with Palestinian overtures of recognition of the right
of the Jewish people to an independent state in the region. The result is
distrust of the other’s sincerity by both sides. Symbolic gestures provide
openings only if consistent actions follow.
One way to assess whether or not an apology might work is to ﬂoat it
through back channels or try it out in private. As we have seen, the Federal
Republic of Germany’s apology to the Jewish people took serious negotia-
tion before ﬁnally reaching a text acceptable to Germany and sufﬁcient for
Israel.
Reframe Responsibility
In the winter of 2008, Israel was unable to prevent numerous rocket attacks
coming from the Gaza Strip. The continuing attacks were a challenge to
Israel’s sovereignty and honor. The Israeli government had a choice about
whom to hold responsible. It chose to hold responsible Fateh as well as its
rival, Hamas, even though Hamas had control of the Gaza Strip. In other
words, Israel chose a frame that held Palestine as a whole responsible for
what any of their factions did. Framing the situation this way had the
advantage for Israel of putting pressure on Hamas not only directly, but also
indirectly through Fateh. But if Fateh had little leverage on the actions of
Hamas, then holding Fateh as well as Hamas responsible would not be
effective. Indeed,holding Fateh responsible would risk undermining Fateh’s
policy of restraint toward Israel.
Alternatively, Israel could have reframed the situation so as to hold only
Hamas (and its allies inGaza) responsible for the rocket attacks.Reframing the
situation this way would have forgone whatever leverage Fateh might have
had over Hamas but would have the advantage of sustaining the understand-
ings with Fateh that have led to a relatively low level of attack from the West
Bank.Which frame would best serve Israel’s interest in the long run would
depend on whether Fateh had effective capacity to pressure Hamas or could
get such capacity if pushed hard enough. In general, the choice of how to
frame responsibility for an action from the other side is implicitly a matter of
strategic analysis even more than a question about which frame is more
accurate as a description of who caused the action to be taken.16 Of course,
Israel was not completely free to choose any frame it wished. In particular,
holding only Hamas responsible would not have been tolerated by those
Israelis who refused to make any distinctions among Palestinian factions as
long as Israel’s sovereignty and honor were being challenged.
A Possible Key to Impossible Conﬂicts
Reframing sacred values presents special difﬁculties and opportunities for
overcoming barriers to seemingly intractable conﬂicts. The difﬁculty in
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reframing issues that involve sacred values lies in the people’s general
unwillingness to concede that they will ever abandon, or even signiﬁcantly
change, their attachment to a sacred value.Doing so would likely be seen as
tantamount to abandoning or altering core social identity. The opportuni-
ties for reframing issues that involve sacred values arise from the fact that
their propositional content is generally open-textured, somewhat the way
metaphors are. This is particularly true of religious values,which survive in
time and spread in space because they are readily reinterpretable in ways
that are sensitive to changing contexts (Atran and Norenzayan 2004).
In sum, our empirical ﬁndings from the Middle East and our historical
examples suggest an approach to seemingly intractable political conﬂicts
that differs from received wisdom about“business-like”negotiations. Asking
the other side to compromise a sacred value by offering material conces-
sions can make matters worse,not better.Our evidence shows that both the
public and its leaders may interpret such material offers as an insult.
Surprisingly, however, our survey results and discussions with leaders indi-
cate that even materially intangible symbolic gestures that show respect for
the other side and its core values may open the door to dialogue in the
worst of conﬂicts.
Finding ways to reframe core values so as to overcome psychological
barriers to symbolic offerings is a daunting challenge. But meeting this
challenge may offer greater opportunities for breakthroughs to peace than
hitherto realized. The difﬁculty in creatively reframing sacred values may
provide a key to unlocking the most deep-seated conﬂicts.
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1. In particular, rather than focus on positions,we focus on the parties’ underlying interests,
including the protection of sacred values, and rather than bargaining over positions, we focus on
recognizing and acknowledging the sacred values involved in order to invent options for mutual
gain.
2. Graham Allison (1971) shows how bureaucratic interests can affect the “face of an issue.”
Kingdon (1995) shows how “policy entrepreneurs” can get an issue on the national agenda by
advocating particular problem deﬁnitions and proposals.
3. We do not wish to imply that devoted actors are irrational. Devoted actors use the logic
of appropriateness (I choose something because I think it is appropriate for perceived rules and/or
to what I consider to be my identity) rather than the logic of consequences (I choose something
because of its anticipated consequences) (March and Olsen 1989). Of course, to protect an
important value, a consequentialist might wish to appear to be using the logic of appropriateness
(Schelling 1960).
4. For work on overcoming cultural barriers in negotiation see Lederach (1995), Grove and
Carter (1999), and Bazerman, Tebrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni (2008).
5. A useful website on intractable conﬂicts is at http://www.beyondintractability.org/
index.jsp?nid=1, accessed March 19, 2008.
6. In the aftermath of opposition to the 1765 Stamp Act, which many colonists saw as a
violation of the “rights of free men” to the principal of no taxation without representation,
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England’s Parliament continued to insist on the principal of taxing its colonies but tried to mollify
opposition by imposing only moderate duties. The supposedly innocuous nature of the taxes,
argued John Dickinson in Letters From a Farmer in Pennsylvania in 1768, masked their true
perniciousness: “Nothing is wanted at home but a PRECEDENT, the force of which shall be
established by the tacit submission of the colonies . . . IF Parliament succeeds in this attempt, other
statutes will impose sums of money as they choose to take,without any other LIMITATION than
their PLEASURE.”
7. The results are based on two surveys of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.Both were
conducted in person.One was a sample of 535 refugees interviewed in December 2005. The other
was a random sample of 719 Palestinian students surveyed individually in fourteen Palestinian
university campuses throughout the West Bank and Gaza in May–June 2006, a month before the
Israeli re-entry into Gaza. The student sample consisted of approximately equal numbers of
students who self-identiﬁed as Islamists (50.1 percent) and nationalists (49.9 percent), of males
(49.9 percent) and females (50.1 percent).
8. In experiments in which psychologist Douglas Medin offers people an exact material
replication of their wedding ring, as well as a signiﬁcant cash bonus, they generally do not
accept the bargain. Those who trade are usually in the process of getting a divorce or are
foreign spouses of Americans from cultures in which rings are not symbols of the sanctity of
marriage.
9. Note that cricket matches between India and Pakistan are not likely to have such an effect
because cricket has more or less equal value for both countries, so that game becomes zero-sum,
with only a loser and a winner.
10. For details of the ﬁrst two surveys see endnote 7. The third survey sampled 601
Jewish adults residing in the West Bank and Gaza (settlers). This sample was selected via
random digit dialing procedures in which all telephone numbers had an equal probability of
selection. This population consists primarily of people who moved to the West Bank and Gaza
after the 1967 war for economic beneﬁts or religious/ideological beliefs and who occupy
signiﬁcant tracts of land that would make up a Palestinian State and who generally refuse to
leave. The survey was carried out in August 2005, a few days before the Israeli withdrawal from
Gaza.
11. See also Pollack (2004) and World Federation of Scientists (2007).On January 7, 1998, the
new “reformist” Iranian president Mohamed Khatami stated in an interview with CNN:“I do know
that the feelings of the great American people have been hurt, and of course I regret it.” He
reiterated Iranian grievances against the United States but went on to compare in a very positive
vein the current process of nation building in Iran with the heroic age of American nation building
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On April 12, 1999, at a formal dinner at the White
House President Bill Clinton stated with pointed reference to Iran: “I think sometimes it’s quite
important to tell people, look, you have a right to be angry at something my country or my culture
did to you ﬁfty or sixty or one-hundred or one-hundred-ﬁfty years ago. But that is different from
saying that I am outside the faith, and you are God’s chosen.”
12. An important question here is whether the very act of apology was partly responsible for
the loss of support for Barak (and Khatami; see endnote 11). Public support on the issue may ﬁrst
have to be sounded out or prepared.
13. This expression was coined by Israel Zangwill a century ago. The point Zangwill was
making was that the Arab population of Palestine was not a distinct nationality.
14. On issues related to framing in the Northern Ireland case see also Grove and Carter
(1999), Byrne (2001), and Stephenson, Condor, and Abell (2007).
15. Another telling example of a failed apology concerns Japan’s attempts to compensate the
aging victims of its wartime sexual slavery. In 1995, Japan set up the Asian Women’s Fund to pay
out money to former “comfort women” in South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. But the
Japanese government stressed that the money came from “citizens” and not from the government
itself, arguing that postwar treaties absolve it from all individual claims related to World War Two.
The governments of Taiwan and South Korea rejected payments from the fund, accusing Japan of
failing to clearly take moral responsibility in “atoning” for its treatment of the women. For general
advice on apologies, see Goldberg, Green, and Sander (1987). On the conditions for success of an
apology in health care disputes, see Robbennolt (2005).
16. This analysis applies the idea of rewarding positive acts as well as punishing hostile
acts. For a sophisticated treatment of the long-run effects of alternative frames, see Dennett
(2003).
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